Research Article

Formal and Real Authority in Organizations

Philippe Aghion, Jean Tirole

GAICIL Insights

The boss holds the title.1 Whoever holds the information often holds the decision. Formal and Real Authority in Organizations, by Philippe Aghion and Jean Tirole, develops a theory distinguishing formal authority, the right to decide, from real authority, the effective control over decisions. It shows how a formally integrated structure can accommodate various degrees of real integration.

Real authority is set by the structure of information, which in turn depends on the allocation of formal authority. A principal with formal authority may defer to a better-informed subordinate, handing that subordinate real authority. More real authority for the agent promotes initiative but costs the principal control. That tradeoff is the heart of organizational design.

When does delegation make sense? Delegating formal authority eases the agent's participation and fosters the incentive to acquire relevant information, at the cost of lost control. Formal authority is therefore more likely to be delegated for decisions that are relatively unimportant to the principal, where the principal can trust the agent, that matter to the agent, and that are innovative enough that the principal has not built substantial prior expertise. Novelty pushes power downward.

Communication bends around authority too. Centralization, the non-delegation of formal authority, may jeopardize communication by making the agent worry about being overruled, though it can favor communication when the agent trusts the superior. Who holds the right to decide shapes how much the organization learns.

Several forces raise a subordinate's real authority inside a formally integrated structure: overload, lenient rules, urgency of decisions, reputation for moderate interventionism, performance measurement and multiple superiors. A principal with a large span of control cannot monitor every decision, so subordinates gain effective control. The authors present the paper as a first step toward a general theory of authority and its delegation.

Artificial intelligence rewires the information structure at the center of the theory. Better information and analysis in the principal's hands could raise the principal's real authority and reduce reliance on subordinates. AI tools in subordinates' hands could widen their information advantage and real authority. The same technology can centralize or decentralize; deployment decides.

The innovation result is the sharpest prediction for AI adoption. Adoption involves many novel decisions where principals lack prior expertise. The theory predicts organizations will delegate authority over AI implementation to those with relevant knowledge, promoting initiative and information acquisition. The executive who insists on approving every AI choice may be the bottleneck.

The framework also covers delegating decisions to AI systems themselves. Organizations choose which decisions to automate and which to keep under human control. The initiative-versus-control tradeoff applies: delegating to AI may gain speed and information processing and lose control. The paper's factors, such as decision importance and trust, offer a checklist for the choice.

Communication matters for learning. Subordinates who fear being overruled may stay silent about how AI could improve operations. Structures that build trust and delegate appropriately help organizations learn about and benefit from AI. Silence is the hidden cost of a heavy hand.

Overload and urgency matter more as AI speeds things up. Faster decision cycles may push real authority toward those closest to operations. AI-enabled performance measurement could also raise subordinates' real authority by making their contributions more visible. Faster clocks redistribute power.

Seen whole, the paper's message is plain: formal and real authority differ, and real authority follows information. Delegation buys initiative and information acquisition at the price of control. As AI reshapes information flows, this framework explains how authority will shift and how organizations can design structures to capture the technology's benefits.

Something for leaders rolling out AI to sit with: the org chart will not tell you who decides once the tools spread. Ask where the information now sits, and you will find where real authority has quietly moved, whether that was the plan or not.

Introduction

This paper develops a theory of the allocation of formal authority (the right to decide) and real authority (the effective control over decisions) within organizations, and it illustrates how a formally integrated structure can accommodate various degrees of "real" integration. Real authority is determined by the structure of information, which in turn depends on the allocation of formal authority. An increase in an agent's real authority promotes initiative but results in a loss of control for the principal. After spelling out (some of) the main determinants of the delegation of formal authority within organizations, the paper examines a number of factors that increase the subordinates' real authority in a formally integrated structure: overload, lenient rules, urgency of decision, reputation, performance measurement, and multiplicity of superiors. Finally, the amount of communication in an organization is shown to depend on the allocation of formal authority.

Takeaway

Let us summarize our main points. (a) In an organization, the delegation of formal authority to a subordinate will both facilitate the agent's participation in the organization and foster his incentive to acquire relevant information about the corresponding activities. On the other hand, delegation involves a costly loss of control for the principal. As a result of this overall trade-off, we found that formal authority is more likely to be delegated for decisions (or activities) that are relatively unimportant for the principal; for which the principal can trust the agent; that are important to the agent, either because private benefits are high or because the principal cannot refrain from hurting the agent; and that are sufficiently "innovative" that the principal has not accumulated substantial prior expertise or competency. (b) We have shown that centralization (the nondelegation of formal authority) may jeopardize communication by making the agent concerned about being overruled, although it can also favor communication when the agent trusts his superior. (c) Finally, we have identified factors that may increase a subordinate's real authority: large span of control, urgency, reputation for moderate interventionism, performance measurement, and multiple principals. There doubtless are other factors, the investigation of which we leave for future research. This paper aims only at being a first step toward a more general theory of authority and its delegation.1

Article

Notes

  1. Philippe Aghion & Jean Tirole, Formal and Real Authority in Organizations, 105 J. Pol. Econ. 1 (1997), https://doi.org/10.1086/262063. Takeaway source: Summary (concluding section), reproduced from a free author or repository copy. ↩

Cite as: Philippe Aghion & Jean Tirole, Formal and Real Authority in Organizations, 105 J. Pol. Econ. 1 (1997), https://doi.org/10.1086/262063

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© 2026 Global AI Competition & Innovation Lab

© 2026 Global AI Competition & Innovation Lab

© 2026 Global AI Competition & Innovation Lab