Beyond Antitrust Populism: Towards Robust Antitrust
GAICIL Insights
The populist use of competition policy is back, the article observes, driven by the growth of big-tech companies and by a greater politicization of enforcement in the United States and Europe. It sets out the basic tenets of antitrust populism to expose the problems it creates.
As an alternative, it builds on Mark Pennington’s “robust political economy”: policy that works even when regulators lack perfect knowledge or perfect motives. For AI, a fast-moving field where no regulator can foresee outcomes, that call for humility is directly relevant.
Abstract
The populist use of competition policies is on the rise again, associated with the growth of big‐tech companies in the era of digital platforms. This article sees antitrust populism as a re‐emerging force in the United States and Europe via greater politicisation of competition law enforcement. It addresses the basic tenets of antitrust populism in order to expose the fundamental problems that populist use of competition law entails. I argue for a rethink of antitrust policy on the intellectual foundations laid down by what Mark Pennington describes as ‘robust political economy’. We need greater regulatory humility and antitrust enforcement which takes both innovation and welfare seriously.1
Takeaway
“We need greater regulatory humility and antitrust enforcement which takes both innovation and welfare seriously.”
Quoted verbatim from the author’s abstract.
Notes
- Aurelien Portuese, Beyond Antitrust Populism: Towards Robust Antitrust, 40 Econ. Affs. 237 (2020), https://doi.org/10.1111/ecaf.12401. Abstract quoted verbatim from the publisher’s abstract record, https://doi.org/10.1111/ecaf.12401. ↩
Cite as: Aurelien Portuese, Beyond Antitrust Populism: Towards Robust Antitrust, 40 Econ. Affs. 237 (2020), https://doi.org/10.1111/ecaf.12401
Header image: Berlaymont building Brussels.jpg by KenSwe72, CC BY 4.0, via Wikimedia Commons.
