Antitrust Populism: Practice
GAICIL Insights
The companion entry turns from history to consequences: what happens in practice when competition policy is used for politically motivated ends rather than guided by antitrust economics.
Its outline of those implications is a useful checklist for assessing enforcement proposals aimed at AI markets.
Abstract
Antitrust populism refers to the populist use of competition policies in order to pursue politically motivated antitrust enforcement in neglect of antitrust economics. The implications of a populist use of competition policies are hereby outlined and discussed.1
Takeaway
“The implications of a populist use of competition policies are hereby outlined and discussed.”
Quoted verbatim from the author’s abstract.
Notes
- Aurelien Portuese, Antitrust Populism: Practice, in Encyclopedia of Law and Economics 93 (Alain Marciano & Giovanni Battista Ramello eds., Springer 2025), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-76422-6_771. Definition quoted verbatim from the publisher’s page, https://link.springer.com/rwe/10.1007/978-3-031-76422-6_771. ↩
Cite as: Aurelien Portuese, Antitrust Populism: Practice, in Encyclopedia of Law and Economics 93 (Alain Marciano & Giovanni Battista Ramello eds., Springer 2025), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-76422-6_771
Header image: The Apex Building, headquarters of the Federal Trade Commission, on Constitution Avenue and 7th Streets in Washington, D.C.jpg by Harrison Keely, CC BY 4.0, via Wikimedia Commons.
